Short answer:
In Cochabamba, the city where the modern-day Water Wars started, the
aftermath's distinctly a mixed bag in terms of incrementally greater
autonomy in the form of grassroots water committees that co-exist with
enormous disparity in water and sanitation access between the city's
haves and have-nots. In light of increasing water crises the world over,
the reprehensible, ongoing US Flint water crisis only the most recent high-profile case, lessons of this battle and its aftermath have relevance for all of us.
The
UN General Assembly passed the 2010 Resolution on the Human Right and
Sanitation, establishing a milestone of sorts, and since then Bolivia is
one of the countries to have amended its constitution to include a
Right to Water for Life (1).
Clarification: A Bechtel affiliate, not Bechtel itself, was kicked out of Cochabamba,
Bolivia's 3rd or 4th largest city. OTOH, water privatization initially
proceeded smoothly in the country's capital La Paz-El Alto region.
Crucial difference? Cochabamba has limited nearby water sources while
gravity helps La Paz-El Alto get the bulk of their water from the nearby
Tuni Condoriri glacier (2).
Thus, unlike Cochabamba, for La Paz-El Alto, a private entity needn't
incur expensive costs for transportation, and storage and pumping
infrastructure (2).
Yet, years later the La Paz-El Alto water privatization scheme also
engendered enough social unrest to trigger a 2nd water war in Bolivia (3).
Public sentiment from these two examples in Bolivia at least thus
suggests that water privatization's unpopular, and rightfully so.
Backdrop to the Bechtel-Bolivia story
In water-insecure Cochabamba, conflicts over water access date back to colonial times (2).
The year 2000 was a watershed moment in Bolivia's history when the
poorest people in Cochabamba banded together in protest and successfully
kicked out Aguas del Tunari, an international consortium whose major shareholder was the US Bechtel
. In September 1999, under pressure from the World Bank, the Bolivian
government had awarded it a concession for the city's water supply. The
terms, mandated by World Bank, dictated a rate hike to ensure Bechtel
had a guaranteed annual 15% ROI (Return on Investment) (4). In October
1999, the Hugo Banzer-led government passed Law No. 2029, the Potable Water and Sanitary Law (Ley de Servicios de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado Sanitario)
legalizing this concession. The law entailed a system of concessions
and licenses for potable water. It stipulated that, concessions granted,
concessionaires had a 40-year exclusive right over the concession
areas. This included outright expropriation, i.e., taking control of all
autonomous water systems without compensating the communities who'd
built them (5, 6, 7).
Come January 2000, many of Cochabamba poorest citizens haplessly faced
abrupt water rate hikes, in some places as high as 300% (8, 9, 10).
Three major, increasingly more violent uprisings ensued. In the final,
most violent one, hundreds were wounded and 4 including a 17-year old
died when police used tear gas and live ammunition (10, 11, 12). On April 9, 2000, the city government capitulated and rescinded the concession. The world over Cochabamba's Guerra del Agua came to be known as the Water War, 2000 Cochabamba protests.
Legal consequences of Cochabamba's Water War
The
Potable Water and Sanitation Law, Law No. 2066, was revised on 11
April, 2000 and in 2004, the irrigation law, Law No. 2878, was updated
for the 1st time in 98 years. These laws (13, 14, 15)
- Uphold the rights of traditional water uses.
- Establish concessionaires can't have monopoly rights within their concession areas.
- Grant community water systems the right to apply for and receive concessions for indefinite periods of time.
- Provide for a system of licenses for larger water providers and municipal governments.
- Provide for registeries for indigenous communities and peasant associations and unions.
- Decentralize irrigation governance, necessary to placate medium-scale Cochabamba region farmers who depend on irrigation.
Post-Water War Cochabamba Water Supply: What's Changed?
Resurrected post-Water War, SEMAPA (Servicio Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado
or Municipal Potable Water and Sanitation Service), Cochabamba's
municipal water service, doesn't have enough water in its network to
supply the city's poorest southern residents. Thus, their lot
unimproved, their water needs are instead met by a combination of water
tankers (aguateros), and formal and informal water committees (comites de agua) (16).
Though
their authority and legitimacy expanded from modifications to the law
post-Water War, such water committees actually arose organically in the
area even prior to it. Usually, 'a group of neighbors get together,
pool their resources to drill a well, install a pump and build a network
of pipes to connects their' houses (15).
However,
their post-Water War consolidation and expanded scope is fueled by
desperation to improve water and sanitation access of their impoverished
members which contrasts obscenely with that of Cochabamba's haves in
the North-Center and amply justifies their existence (see figures and
data below from 17, 18).
In 2004, many Cochabamba water committees joined to form ASICASUDD-EPSAS (Asociación de Sistemas Comunitarios de Agua del Sud, Departamental y Entidades Prestadoras de Servicio de Agua y Saneamiento,
Association of Community Water Systems of the South, of the Department,
and Provider Entities of Water and Sanitation Services) (15),
a hybrid group connected to both the local government through SEMAPA as
well as to international funds through NGOs. Much of its funds come
from the Italian organization CeVI (Centro di Volontariato Internazionale) (15).
Committees not joining ASICASUDD-EPSAS opted to become OTBs (Organizaciones Territoriales de Base, or Grassroots Territorial Organisations). Critical difference? OTBs can access public funding. Problem is relations between ASICASUDD-EPSAS and OTBs range all the way from 'complete co-operation to direct antagonism' (15).
One reason is ASICASUDD-EPSAS' mistrust stemming from fear of state
manipulation of OTBs. Thus, most water committees try to keep distance
from all political parties, especially Evo Morales' party, MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo)
(19). As well, though the Bolivian constitution explicitly enshrines
Right to Water for Life, these poorer collectives distance themselves
from it, preferring to instead identify with Water as a Common Good
since they feel a Right to Water advocates for individualistic rights
(20), a crucial philosophical difference it behooves all of us, not just
poor Cochabamba residents, to ponder seriously.
Be they ASICASUDD-EPSAS or OTBs, all partner with a variety of NGOs, part of what's called the 'NGO-isation of Latin America', (21,
22). NGOs came to occupy the vacuum left behind as the Bolivian state
retreated when neoliberalism prevailed from the 1980s to the early
2000s. In fact, Marston reports that water-oriented NGOs working in
Cochabamba increased exponentially post-Water War (15).
Prominent NGOs include Agua Sustentable, Aguatuya, Asociación Yaku
founded in Italy in 2007 as part of the Italian Forum of Movements for
Water as a Common Good united in solidarity against water privatization,
Fundación Abril founded by Water War leader Oscar Olivera, and Water For People.
Management
of water committees is influenced by members' backgrounds, i.e.,
experience in miner or peasant unions or church-based and non-profit
organizations as well as input from NGOs, which is actually often
perceived as undue pressure. They usually have at least a president and
secretary to monitor water payments. Many don't have access to
sufficient groundwater to meet members' needs. Instead they purchase
water in bulk from aguateros to fill up shared water tanks or large cisterns (10, 12, 15, 16).
Often such water is of questionable quality. Long-term goal of these
committees is to connect their networks to a more reliable water source
such as the Misicuni Dam.
Misicuni Dam: In Limbo, Cochabamba's Thirsty Poor Resignedly Await Its Long-Promised Agua
Harking
back to the 1950s big dam era, this dam offers impoverished Cochabamba
residents the shimmering, perhaps elusive, promise of autonomy and
identity since it would rely on water from the Cochabamba valley
catchment area, a region that potentially faces desertification due to
too rapid and chaotic urbanization (23).
Partially constructed, then halted, and currently in the process of being re-bid (24, 25),
Misicuni remains a mirage to Cochabamba's poorest residents, whose
desperate water needs are instead addressed by stop-gap water committees
who negotiate on their behalf or by rapacious aguateros, who prefer delivering their water to wealthier residents with larger storage tanks and better road accessibility (3, 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 26).
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https://www.quora.com/What-has-happened-in-Bolivia-since-Bechtel-was-kicked-out-in-terms-of-water-rights-costs-and-quality-of-life/answer/Tirumalai-Kamala
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